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Abstract More than 10 years have passed since trusted
computing (TC) technology was introduced to the market;
however, there is still no consensus about its value. The
increasing importance of user and enterprise security and
the security promised by TC, coupled with the increasing
tension between the proponents and the opponents of TC,
make it timely to investigate the value relevance of TC in
terms of both capital market and accounting performance.
Based on both price and volume studies, we found that
news releases related to the adoption of the TC technology
had no information content. All investors, regardless of
whether they are individual investors or institutional
investors, or they are wealthy individual investors or less
wealthy individual investor, all have similar views on the
value of TC. Further, we show that the accounting benefit
gained from the adoption of TC is trivial, which might
explain the price invariance and volume invariance we
observed in the stock market.
Keywords Trust computing  Trading volume 
Trading price  Information contents  Different types
of investors  Firm performance
1 Introduction
1.1 Crossfire
Almost 10 years have passed since trusted computing (TC)
technology was introduced to the market; however, there is
still no consensus on its value. Since day one, TC technology
has attracted intensive crossfire. The TC proponents such as
International Data Corporation [1], the Enterprise Strategy
Group [2], and Endpoint Technologies Associates claim that
this technology will allow computers to provide hardware-
based security that cannot be bypassed by most software
attacks [3]. Until now, around 200 members including
AMD, Intel, Microsoft, Sun, IBM, and Dell have joined the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG, formerly TCPA). Since
2004, most major chip, computer, and network manufac-
turers have shipped TC-enabled systems (servers, desktops,
laptops, tablets, motherboards, and chipsets) in accordance
with the TCG specifications [4]. Numerous applications
have been developed to support TC technology. Some
examples are Microsoft’s BitLocker Drive Encryption,
Linux’s Enforcer, Seagate’s Full Disk Encryption, TCG’s
Trusted Software Stack TrouSerS, Java interface to TPM
capabilities TPM/J, and TPM-supported Grub bootloader
Trusted Grub. As the number of manufacturers supporting
TC increases, the US Army and the Department of Defense
require that every new small PC purchased since 2007 be
equipped with TC hardware [5, 6]. The International Data
Corporation predicts that almost all portable PCs and most
desktops will include TPM chips by 2010. The diffusion of
TC technology may lead to ‘‘the biggest change of the
information landscape since decades’’ [7].
On the other hand, the TC opponents such as the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, the Free Software Founda-
tion, GNU/Linux and FreeBSD communities, the software
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development community, and many security researchers
claim that the technology exposes end-users to new risks of
anti-consumer and anti-competitive behavior. The root of
this problem is that the technology puts trust in the creators
of TC systems instead of the owners of the platforms. Ross
Anderson [8] pointed out that the remote censorship feature
of TC technology may be misused by those who design
systems and software. As a result, the users who own the
platforms may lose control over the digital objects they
created. Another consequence of using TC technology is
that software suppliers can make it very difficult and costly
for software users to switch to their competitors’ products.
It also raises privacy concerns since each trusted platform
module has a unique key-pair that identifies the platform
(the privacy concerns can be mitigated using the direct
anonymous attestation in TPM version 1.2). It has been
argued that TC technology will provide only minor pro-
tection against worms and viruses. Due to these concerns,
opponents recommend against the adoption of TC tech-
nology until the owner control, competition, interopera-
bility, and other similar problems are addressed.
Trusted computing could be used for good purposes as
well as for bad purposes [8–10]. To understand this
extremely controversial issue, we briefly summarize the
key concepts and prospective positives and negatives.
Regardless of whether one supports TCG, he/she should
care about how individual customers perceive TC tech-
nology because it is the end users’ perception that really
determines the future of TC. Given the long-lasting, on
going, and increasingly intensive tension over the value of
TC between academic researchers and individual vendors,
we believe that it is important and timely to understand (1)
whether consumers really understand the value of TC; (2)
who understands the value of TC, sophisticated institu-
tional investors or small individual investors, wealthy
investors or less wealthy investors; and (3) does adoption
of TC really lead to an overall better firm financial per-
formance? Going through this exercise will enable us to
answer the question between the two sides of TC tech-
nology, which side is winning the battle and who might
ultimately win the battle.
1.2 Key concepts
There are five key technology concepts in TC: endorsement
key, secure I/O, memory curtaining, sealed storage, and
remote attestation. First, the endorsement key is a 2,048-bit
RSA key pair created randomly on a security chip at
manufacture time. The endorsement key cannot be changed
after it is created. The private key never leaves the chip; it
is used to generate a digital signature on a random number
to prove the identity of the security chip in a secure
transaction. The public key can be used for attestation and
encryption of sensitive data sent to the chip. Second, the
secure I/O protects data traveling between a user and a
software process. It uses check sums to verify that the
software involved in I/O process is not compromised.
Third, the memory curtaining provides full isolation of
sensitive areas of memory for protected execution of
software processes. Next, the sealed storage encrypts pri-
vate information so that it can be decrypted only in certain
platform configurations (software and hardware combina-
tion). Finally, the remote attestation allows a remote party
to verify the security status of the software running on a
local computer based on a certificate generated by the
trusted hardware at the local computer.
1.3 What are the positives?
Trusted computing technology, if implemented appropri-
ately, can be used to protect computer systems for their
owners. For example, the TC technology could be used to
thwart identity theft in online banking transactions. When a
customer is connected to a bank’s server, the remote
attestation could be used to check the security status of the
software running on the customer’s platform and the ser-
ver’s. Then, the customer would browse the page if
the server could produce the correct certificate before the
customer sends his/her account number and PIN to the
bank over a secure channel. The sealed storage function
could be used to assure computer users that no spyware is
able to steal the users’ sensitive information such as bio-
metric authentication data. The remote attestation, secure
I/O, and memory curtaining could be used to prevent
cheating in online games by verifying that all players
connected to the server are running unmodified copies of
software.
1.4 What are the negatives?
TC technology can be potentially misused by its creators to
secure computers against their owners. In digital rights
management (DRM), for example, a company who sells
digital products such as music and movies could use
remote attestation to send their files to only the legitimate
players that enforces their DRM rules. The sealed storage
would prevent users from opening the files with tampered
players or other players. The memory curtaining and the
secure I/O could be used to prevent users from making
unrestricted copies when the files are playing. With TC
technology, the users’ computers could be potentially
controlled by governments, software vendors, and digital
content providers in a way that restricts the users’ freedom
of choice. After all, the computer owners do not have
access to the private keys stored in the security chips in
their computers.
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1.5 Who wins?
There is no settled conclusion about who wins the fight on
TC. Open debates on TC technology have been going for
nearly 10 years. It is timely to investigate the current status
and future trend of this technology in the global market in
an objective and scientific manner.
For this purpose, we investigate how the capital market
responds to news releases related to major corporations
adopting TC technology, such as the release of TC hardware
and software, joining the TCG, or confirming the support of
TCG. Much to our surprise we found that there was no
abnormal price response to the adoption of TC technology in
practice, failing to support the claims that the announce-
ments of such events have information content. Furthermore,
different investors, regardless of whether they are sophisti-
cated institutional investors or less sophisticated individual
investors, do not value TC technology. This finding is very
confounding because TC technology has demonstrated its
potential to bring in ‘‘the biggest change of information
landscape since decades,’’ and the stock market is supposed
to respond to any information that can change investors’
beliefs about a firm’s future profitability. However, the
capital market seems to have totally ignored the adoption
events as if those events had never happened. So, why does
not the efficient capital market reflect this information? Is it
because the market has not sensed a winner in the fight
between proponents and opponents of the technology?
To investigate whether the capital market really behaves
rationally, we turn to studying the impact of TC on
accounting performance. We investigate whether the
adoption of TC technology leads to a better future perfor-
mance. Our portfolio and multivariate regression analyses
also show that the adoption of TCG has no impact on the
actual accounting performance as well. This means that the
lack of impact on the capital market on TC can be
explained by the fact that the adoption of TC cannot lead to
a company’s better future financial performance. Since the
adoption of TC does not change investors’ expectation of a
firm’s future profitability, there is no price or volume
response to the announcement of TC adoption.
Looking ahead, it remains unclear whether the tech-
nology will gain popularity among computer users, as they
have not decided ‘‘whether they really trust the good guys
(governments and software vendors) more than they fear
the bad guys (hackers)’’ [11]. Ultimately, it is computer
users instead of vendors who decide the fate of TC. The
users need to weigh their benefits against the costs of
enabling the technology [9]. It does not appear that users
believe that they will benefit significantly from the tech-
nology at this moment because protection against worms
and viruses is limited [12], and some of the features pro-
vided by TC can already be established by today’s smart
card supported systems. On the other hand, users’ costs
could be high due to the interoperability, competition,
owner control, and similar problems inherent in the TC
technology. Even if the vendors have the power to populate
the market with TC-enabled products, users have the option
of not enabling the TC functionality if choices were given.
Just as Sony and Apple announced their DRM-free music
after the Sony BMG copy protection scandal, the vendors
of TC may face the same situation if the opposition is too
vocal. To really make TC work, the proponents of the
technology need to address users’ concerns about the
technology, while at the same time providing more
incentives or benefits for users to turn on TC functionality.
This demands more research on both the technical side and
the economic side of TC. Before that really happens, we
expect the capital market to remain impervious to the news
announcements related to the adoption of TC.
1.6 Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the related work, Sect. 3 develops our hypotheses,
and Sect. 4 describes our research methodology and data
collection criteria. Section 5 presents our empirical results,
while Sect. 6 discusses the paper’s contributions and
implications for theory and practice.
2 Related work
The trusted computing group (TCG) [7] defines a set of TC
specifications [13–15] aiming to provide a hardware-based
root of trust and a set of mechanisms to propagate trust to
applications as well as across platforms. The root of trust in
TCG is a tamper-resistant hardware engine, called Trusted
Platform Module (TPM). TPM is assumed robust against
both hardware and software attacks from either the under-
lying host or external sources. It is a self-contained copro-
cessor with specialized functions such as random number
generation, RSA key generation, RSA public key algo-
rithms, SHA-1 hash function, HMAC function, and volatile
and non-volatile memory. TPM is associated with an
attestation identity key (AIK) pair. The AIK is issued by the
Privacy Certification Authority (P-CA), together with a
certificate that binds the public AIK to TPM. The private
AIK can be used only by TPM to generate signatures. TPM
is also installed with a unique endorsement key (EK) pair by
the manufacturer before shipping, which is used exclusively
for data encryption purposes. The private EK is securely
held in TPM for decryption operations, and the public EK is
associated with an endorsement credential and accessible to
any application for encrypting data to TPM. TPM facilitates
storage of integrity measurement metrics of the underlying
Inf Technol Manag (2009) 10:177–192 179
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platform to the internal registers, and reporting of the
metrics. In particular, TPM contains a set of platform
configuration registers (PCRs), which are used to record the
integrity and configuration metrics of a running platform
from booting to OS loading to application software loading.
Each PCR value is the SHA-1 hash value of its current value
concatenated with the new measured value of the protected
objects, (i.e., PCR[n] / SHA1(PCR[n] || latest measured
value). Measurement of a platform’s integrity results in the
generation of measurement events, which comprises two
classes of data: measured values, which are representations
of the data or program code to be measured; and measure-
ment digests, which are hashes of the measured values. The
measurement digests are stored to PCRs in TPM, while the
measured values are stored to the stored measurement log
(SML) outside TPM. With integrity measurement in place,
TPM (attestator) can attest to a remote challenging platform
(challenger) the integrity state of its underlying platform
through platform attestation. In particular, attestation works
as follows: the challenger sends a challenge message to the
attestator, who then returns the related PCR values signed
by its attestation identity key (AIK), together with the rel-
evant SML entries and the corresponding credentials. The
challenger validates the response, and decides whether the
attestator platform is trusted for its intended purpose.
TPM provides hardware-based secure storage for sen-
sitive data by storing a storage root key (SRK) inside the
chip and never exposing it outside. Sealed storage is an
essential security mechanism offered by TPM. Sealed
storage protects sensitive data with integrity values. In
particular, besides applying an encryption key (RSA public
key encryption) to encrypt the data, one or more PCR
values are stored together with protected data during the
encryption. Consequently, TPM releases protected data
only if the current PCR values match those stored during
encryption. The encryption key is protected either directly
by SRK, or by a key protected by the SRK. Hence, the SRK
acts as the root of trust for storage, and all encryption keys
can actually form a key hierarchy. SRK is the only storage
key permanently residing within TPM.
The designs and applications of TC have been rigor-
ously studied in recent years [16, 17]. An incomplete list of
the designs and applications include digital rights man-
agement [18, 19], access control enforcement [20–22],
inference control [12], privacy protection [23–25], remote
attestation services [26–28], secure auction [29], e-voting
[30], online gaming [31], grid computing [32], and integ-
rity measurement [33]. While these studies demonstrate
that TC technology can be used for many good purposes, it
is not clear whether these benefits will outweigh the con-
cerns that the users are not trusted from the root.
To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first
attempt to investigate the users’ acceptance of TC from a
capital market prospective. We investigate whether adop-
tion of TC technology is associated with increased trading
price and trading volume, indicating that consumers
appreciate the value of TC technology. We study whether
different investors (institutional investors vs. individual
investors, wealthy vs. less wealthy individual investors)
have different valuations of TC technology. We also
investigate whether such an adoption will lead to improved
future accounting performance, indicating that TC tech-
nology do change the bottom line.
3 Information release and market response
According to prior event studies [34], information mea-
sures the variation in expectations about the outcome of an
event (e.g. the release of annual or quarterly earnings, news
releases regarding the appointment of a new CEO, ana-
lysts’ forecasts, etc). Information released by a firm is
regarded as rich in information content if it has impact on
the stock price of that firm. An underlying assumption for
event studies is market efficiency, which suggests that
stock prices incorporate all available value-relevant infor-
mation about the value-creation and growth prospects of a
firm. Stock price has a forward-looking nature and takes
into account expected future firm performance; hence,
stock price fundamentally reflects investors’ expectation of
a firm’s future profitability. If one information release
includes information that fundamentally changes that
expectation, then the announcement of such information
should be associated with an abnormal stock price.
In the valuation literature, researchers have used event
study to document the price and trading volume response to
IT investments, such as innovative IT investments [35] or
IT infrastructure investment [36]. By studying the market
response to the announcements of ERP implementation
[37], researchers found that there were significant abnormal
stock market returns for ERP vendors such as PeopleSoft
and SAP. Using an event study methodology, Ettredge and
Richardson [38] measured the reactions of investors to
hacking or denial-of-service events for B2B Internet firms
and B2C Internet firms.
As the pros and cons of TC technology are ardently
discussed, all these characteristics also could be captured,
digested, and understood by investors in the stock market
as well. Following previous valuation studies [35–38], in
this study we adopt event study methodology to investigate
the value relevance of TC technology. If capital market
participants perceive the value creation of TC technology,
then new information related to TC adoption should
increase investors’ expectations about a firm’s future
profitability, resulting in an increased stock price. How-
ever, if investors do not understand the value of TC
180 Inf Technol Manag (2009) 10:177–192
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adoption and do not believe that TC will change a firm’s
future profitability, then the TC announcements will have
no information content. In such a case, there will be no
price response to the announcements of TC.
H1 If TC technology adoption is perceived to be good
(bad) news, then the announcements of TC technology
related adoption should be associated with an increased
(decreased) stock price.
Volume response is different from price response. Price
measures the ‘‘average’’ investor’s response, while volume
reflects an individual’s asymmetric perceptions of a firm’s
future prospects [39]. Even though price and volume are
often positively correlated, they represent two different
aspects of an individual’s expectation adjustment processes
[39]. The impact of newly released information on investors
might vary because (a) investors have different capabilities
in terms of information acquisition (they might use different
information for evaluation purposes), and (b) even if they
use the same sets of information to make purchase decisions,
their interpretation of the same information might differ as
well. Thus trading volume arises when there is a lack of
consensus regarding newly released information among
investors. However, if none of the investors values TC
technology, or they interpret a TC announcement homoge-
neously, compared to a non-event period, there will be no
more volume occurring within the event period. Therefore
no matter whether TC technology adoption is considered as
favorable or unfavorable by capital market participants, as
long as investors value TC and have different interpretations
of the TC-related announcements, then we expect
H2 TC technology related announcements are associated
with increased over-all trading volume.
An increase in the trading volume might not mean that
all investor groups understand the value of the information.
As suggested by previous literature [40], due to the
intrinsic information access and digest capabilities differ-
ence as well as resource owned, when making investment
decisions, big investors tend to rely more on interim dis-
closure information due to their high information acquisi-
tion skill as well as the rich resources they owned. Small
investors tend to place great emphasis on the public dis-
closure information (i.e., the annual report), and are more
likely to trade on pro forma information [41]. Due to the
sophisticated nature of TC technology, the announcement
of the adoption of such technologies might be appreciated
only by certain groups of investors, such as institutional
investors or wealth individual investors, who have the
resources and capability to acquire and digest TC related
information. Given the complexity nature of TC technol-
ogy, we expect that
H3 Different investors respond differently to TC tech-
nology related announcements. Institutional investors
increase their trading relative to individual investors when
facing TC announcements, and among individual investors,
wealthy investors, as opposed to less wealthy investors,
trade more in response to TC announcements.
4 Research methodology
4.1 Methodology development
Figure 1 provides an overview of the key conceptual
constructs that we adopt to study the market response and
performance impact of TC technology related adoption.
Both accounting and capital market performance are used
because it has been observed that relations between per-
formance and technological investment may be difficult to
detect using contemporaneous accounting-based output
measures. Accounting tracks short-term performance
whereas benefits from technological investments may be
realized over a longer time frame [42].
For the capital market perspective, we adopt event study
methodology to study both the return (measures the over-
all market perception) and the trading response (measures
the consensus among investors) to the announcements of
AbnVol AbnTr APOS
CAPM
Fama
French
Model
Fama
French
Adjustment
Return Study Trading Study
Aggregate
Measure
Relative
Measure
TCG Adoption
Comparison
ROA ROS SOA
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1UMTS100AbnTr 30AbnTr 9UMTSbigAbnVol smallAbnVol
Stock Market
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Accounting
Performance
Fig. 1 Basic research model
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TC. For the trading perspective, in order to capture the
possibility that TC might be understood only by certain
groups of investors (e.g., wealthy individual investors or
institutional investors), we study both aggregate as well as
relative trading behavior. For the accounting perspective,
we study the future performance impact of TC adoption
while controlling for the historical financial performance
(Halo Effect).
Event studies, also called short window studies, have
been widely used in the accounting and finance literature to
study whether the market responds to events, such as IT
investments, newly created CEO, CIO, outsourcing, ERP,
etc. Because stock prices incorporate all relevant available
information about the value-creation and growth prospects
of a firm, they may be used to measure the expected influ-
ence of technological investments on long-term perfor-
mance. If the announcements of TC technology related
adoptions have information content, then an abnormal stock
price and trading volume should be observed around such
events.
4.1.1 Price response
In order to calculate the abnormal return of one event, we
need to calculate the expected ‘‘normal’’ stock return. Any
stock return above the normal stock return is called abnor-
mal stock return. For robust checking purposes, three asset
pricing models, Asset pricing model (CAPM) model, Fama–
French three-factor model, and Fama–French adjusted
model, were used to control factors that are known to
influence stock returns. We elaborate each of them below.
4.1.1.1 Asset pricing model The CAPM states that the
expected return of a security equals the rate on a risk-free
security plus a risk premium. Following previous research
[36], a 255-day sample period, which begins 300 days
before the event day (i.e., t - 300) and ends 45 days
before the event day (i.e., t - 45) is used to estimate the
risk measure (beta):
Rit ¼ ai þ biRmt þ eit ð1Þ
where Rit: daily stock return of firm i on day t, Rmt: market
rate of return using the equally-weighted portfolio on day t,
bi: systematic risk of the firm i and ai is an intercept, eit:
error term.
Then, based on the estimated ai and bi, we estimate the
expected ‘‘normal’’ firm returns. The prediction error or the
abnormal return for firm i at day t is computed as:
AbnRit ¼ Rit  ða^i þ b^iRmtÞ ð2Þ
A 5-day event window, beginning 2 days before the
event day (i.e., t - 2) and ending 2 days after the event
day (i.e., t ? 2) was used to analyze the price reaction to
TC technology related announcements. The days from t - 2
to t - 1 are included because there might be information
leakage before firms officially announce their TC
technology adoption to the market; while the days from
t ? 2 to t ? 1 are included because the market might not
respond to TC technology announcements immediately.
However, we expect that the most significant market
reactions, if there are any, happen on day 0.
4.1.1.2 Fama and French three factor model In their
research [43] the authors extend the CAPM model with two
more factors, small cap and book-to-market ratio, because
stocks with small cap and a high book-to-market ratio are
associated with higher return. Thus, our second estimation
method employs the Fama–French three-factor model to
calculate the abnormal returns as follows:
Rit ¼ ai þ bi1Rmt þ bi2 SMB þ bi3 HML þ eit ð3Þ
where Rit: the rate of stock return of the ith firm on day t,
Rmt: the market rate of return using the equally-weighted
portfolio on day t, Small Minus Big (SMB): the average
return on the three small portfolios minus the average
return on the three big portfolios, High Minus Low (HML):
the average return on the two value portfolios minus the
average return on the two growth portfolios,1 eit: error term.
We estimated parameters (ai, bi1, bi2 and bi3) in Eq. 3
from stock market data using the 255-day sample period.
And the final abnormal return of firm i on day t is:
AbnRit ¼ Rit  a^i þ b^i1Rmt þ b^i2SMB þ b^i3HML
 
ð4Þ
Again the daily as well as aggregate abnormal return in
the time window (t - 2, t ? 2) is calculated to capture the
information leakage and delayed effect of an event.
4.1.1.3 Fama French adjustment method For this
method, we identify the peer group of each firm based on its
size and market-to-book ratio. Then the abnormal returns of
each event is calculated by subtracting returns of market
portfolios composed of peers with similar market-to-book
ratios and size from the actual returns earned on each firm
event. We title this method as Fama French Adjustment.
4.1.2 Aggregate trading response
In this section, we examine the trading response to the TC
related information release using abnormal trading volume,
the abnormal number of transactions, and the abnormal
percentage of outstanding shares. As stated before, price
measures the average consumer response, while trading
volume measures different investors’ responses. Even when
1 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Libra
ry/f-f_factors.html.
182 Inf Technol Manag (2009) 10:177–192
123
one set of information has no value, trading can still be
observed due to the fact that investors have different
information acquiring capabilities and might interpret the
same information differently. In the following, the abnor-
mal value is derived by subtracting the normal value in a
non-event window, which is from 205 days (i.e., t - 205) to
5 days (i.e., t - 6) before the event day t (i.e., announce-
ment of TC adoption), from the value in the event window.
4.1.2.1 Abnormal trading volume Following previous
literature [44], based on daily trading volume data from
The Trade and Quote, we estimated abnormal total trading
volume as follows:
AbnVolit ¼
Volit  lVoliðt205; t6Þ
rVoliðt205; t6Þ
ð5Þ
where Volit: trading volume of firm i at day t, which is
calculated as total number of shares traded on day t,
lVoli(t-205, t-6): mean of trading volume of firm i within
the non-event window, rVoli(t-205, t-6): standard deviation
of trading volume of firm i within the non-event window.
4.1.2.2 Transactions Number of transactions, like vol-
ume, can also be used as a measure of trading. This mea-
surement has been used in earlier literature [40] to measure
the change of trading activity of investors to study the
information content of annual reports of firms. It can serve
two purposes:
1. Validate the volume response documented by abnor-
mal trading volume.
2. When abnormal trading volume is positive (negative),
the number of transactions can be used to differentiate
between the situation where there are just more (less)
trades with basically the same transaction size as
before and the situation where there is basically the
same number of trades as before, however each
transaction is bigger (smaller).
AbnTrit ¼
Trit  lTriðt205; t6Þ
rTriðt205; t6Þ
ð6Þ
where Trit: number of transactions of firm i at day t,
lTri(t-205, t-6): mean of the number of transactions of firm i
within the non-event window, rTri(t-205, t-6): standard
deviation of the number of transactions of firm i within the
non-event window.
4.1.2.3 Abnormal percentage of outstanding shares
(APOS) While the daily trading volume and the daily
number of transactions measure trading on an ‘‘absolute’’
level, meaning not controlling for the potential change of
total common share outstanding, daily proportion of shares
traded measures such an activity on a relative level.
Compared to a non-event day, the APOS method assumes
that the proportion of shares outstanding (the number of a
firm’s shares traded divided by the number of that firm’s
shares outstanding on a given day) traded around an event
day will show a positive increase if newly released infor-
mation is value relevant. We define APOS as
APOSit ¼ Porit  lPoriðt205; t6Þ ð7Þ
where Porit: proportion of firm i’s common shares traded
on day t; lPori(t-205, t-6): mean of proportion of firm i’s
common shares traded within the non-event window.
4.1.3 Relative trading response
As discussed before, the announcement of the adoption of
TC technology might be appreciated only by certain groups
of investors. In this section, we measure relative trading
activity among different investor groups in response to TC
technology adoptions using the relative abnormal volume,
the relative abnormal number of transactions, and the mean
transaction-size. Following prior literature, we use both
transaction size [40] and the dollar value of transactions
[44] to proxy for investor type and wealth.
4.1.3.1 Dollar value of transactions Bigger, sophisti-
cated investors are considered to be more skilled in
acquiring and understanding information than small, less
sophisticated ones. To investigate how abnormal trading
volume activity varies among investors in response to
TC-related announcements, we classify big, medium and
small investors using dollar value of transactions following
earlier researches [44–46].
Those trades whose dollar value is bigger than or equal
to $50,000 are classified as big trades, those whose dollar
value is between $5,000 and $50,000 including $5,000 are
classified as medium trades, and those whose dollar value
is less than $5,000 are classified as small trades [44].
However, those trades whose trading price is higher than
$50 and number of shares is less than or equal to 100
shares, are classified as small trades as well [44]. Then, the
abnormal trading volume of each group (AbnVolbig and
AbnVolsmall) is calculated as follows. For consistency with
prior literature [44], we ignore the trading behavior of
medium-sized trades:
AbnVolj;it ¼
Volj; it  lVolj; iðt205; t5Þ
rVolj; iðt205; t5Þ
ðj 2 ðbig; smallÞÞ
ð8Þ
Following prior research [40], the abnormal number of
transactions of big and small investor groups is also
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calculated respectively. Big transactions are those
transactions whose dollar value is greater than $100,000
(Tr100), while small transactions are those whose dollar
value is less than $30,000 (Tr30). Tr100 is interpreted as
measures of unexpected institutional investor trading and
Tr30 as measures of unexpected individual investor trading.
The final abnormal transactions of these two specified
groups are calculated as Eq. 6.
4.1.3.2 Mean transaction size Unexpected mean trans-
action size can be used to measure the relative trading
activities between well-informed institutional investors and
less sophisticated individual investors [40]. As discussed
before, compared to individual investors, institutional
investors might better understand the valuation of TC. The
mean transaction size (MTS) of firm i is defined as the
number of shares traded per day divided by the number of
transactions per day. The unexpected mean transaction size
(UMTS1) is defined as:
UMTS1it ¼
MTSit  lMTSiðt205;t6Þ
lMTSiðt205;t6Þ
ð9Þ
where MTSit: mean transaction size of firm i on day t;
lMTSi(t-205, t-6): average of the mean transaction size of
firm i within the non-event window.
UMTS1 can be viewed as a measure of institutional
relative to individual investor trading [40]. And a negative
(positive) UMTS1 indicates that individual trading is rela-
tively heavier (lighter) than institutional trading. To cap-
ture the relative trading activity by wealthy versus less
wealthy individual investors, a special group of transac-
tions whose size is smaller than 900 shares is selected, and
the mean transaction size of this group of investors is
calculated (UMTS9). And a negative (positive) UMTS9
indicates that trading response among individual investors
decreases (increases) with wealth.
4.1.4 Accounting performance
There is a fundamental difference between stock price and
accounting performance. While stock price is forward
looking, it takes into account the expected future firm
performance, accounting is backward looking—it records
what has already happened. In this section, using matched
sample analysis and multivariate regression, we investigate
whether firms that adopted TC technology tend to enjoy
better financial performance when compared with a mat-
ched control sample of firms, after the adoption year.
Comparing variables of interest across treatment and
control groups is a widely used and established research
methodology [47–50] and identifying a matching sample
fundamentally is an empirical challenge [51]. In the IT
valuation studies, researchers have adopted the matching
sample analysis methodology to validate their hypotheses
[52, 53]. For example, Bharadwaj [52] compares the mean
and median financial performances of a portfolio composed
of IT leader firms vs. the financial performances of a
portfolio composed of non-IT leader firms with similar size
in the same industry to investigate whether IT leaders have
better current and future financial performance. While
replicating the results of early work [52], Santhanam and
Hartono [53] observed that the choice of a single firm
benchmark could lead to results influenced by selection
biases. Furthermore, an industry average is generally con-
sidered a better benchmark when a comparison of the
financial performance of a set of specified firms is
employed [54, 55]. Thus they proposed and used an
alternative approach by utilizing all firms, excluding the
IT-leaders, in the same industry (4-digit SIC code) as their
matching sample group. Due to the above reason, in this
study, we adopt methods proposed by Santhanam and
Hartono [53] to compare the financial performance of TC
technology adopters to their respective 4-digital SIC
industry average (excluding the adopters) to answer whe-
ther TC adopters enjoy better future financial performance
after adoption.
Firm performance can be measured using multi-dimen-
sional financial indicators (e.g., profitability, sales growth),
operational efficiency (e.g. asset turn over), or both. An
empirically sound approach to evaluate firm performance is
to use multi-dimensional indicators [56]. For this purpose,
the following financial ratios are utilized to answer our
research questions.
Return on Asset (ROA) = Net Income/Total Assets:
measures profitability.
Profit Margin (ROS) = Net Income/Sales: measures
profitability.
Asset Turnover Ratio (SOA) = Sales/Total Assets:
measures utilization and efficiency.
The General Motors model splits ROA into profit mar-
gin and asset turnover [57]. Profit margins increase if
companies are able to increase gross margins on products
and services sold (higher selling price relative to product
cost) or improve the effectiveness of sales and adminis-
trative inputs. Asset turnover increases if companies are
able to utilize their assets more effectively (support greater
Asset Turnover
Sales / Total AssetsNet income / Sales
Return on Assets
Net Income / Total Assets
Profit Margin
Fig. 2 The general motors model
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levels of sales revenue with a certain quantity of assets)
(Fig. 2).
Assuming by comparing the mean performances
between TCG firms and industry peers, we document that
there is a difference, still we could not conclude that TC
adoption really leads to better (worse) performance in the
future. A potential problem with the above peer group
comparison is that the adoption of TC technology might be
driven by the historical financial performance. In other
words, maybe firms with a better (worse) financial per-
formance are more likely to adopt TCG. So it might be the
performance that drives the adoption, not the other way
around. Because firms with a better (worse) historical
financial performance might enjoy an even better (worse)
future financial performance, in such case, it is not the
strategy of adopting TC that leads to better financial per-
formance. To control for such a halo effect, following prior
research [53], we adopt a multivariate regression approach
in which previous financial performance are controlled:
ROAtþi ¼ aroa þ broa;1 ROAt þ broa;2 Dummy
ROStþi ¼ aros þ bros;1 ROSt þ bros;2 Dummy
SOAtþi ¼ asoa þ bsoa;1 SOAt þ bsoa;2 Dummy
where t is the year when a firm first adopts TC technology,
and t ? i represents i year after adoption. Dummy is a
binary variable and equals 1 for TC technology adopter,
and 0 for industry average.
4.2 Hypotheses
Three major hypotheses are set up in this study, stated in
null forms (Table 1) to investigate the market response to
the announcements of TC technology related events.
The first hypothesis (H1) is to measure the change in
investors’ expectations regarding the future profitability of
a firm. A significant positive AbnR signals that investors
value TC and respond with an increasing price, while a
significant negative AbnR shows the reality that investors
are against TC related technology, and view such
announcements as a bad move by a firm. Failing to reject
this hypothesis means that consumers do not understand the
nature and the future of TC technology and choose to
ignore any information related to TC, resulting in price
invariance related to the TC information release.
The second set of hypotheses (H2) measures the
aggregate trading activities in response to TC information
releases, which contain abnormal total volume, an abnor-
mal number of transactions, and an unexpected percentage
of outstanding shares (APOS) around event days. A sig-
nificant positive AbnVol or AbnTr or APOS value indi-
cates that investors do value TC technology but their
valuations are heterogeneous.
The last set of hypotheses (H3) measures relative trading
behavior of different investor groups around the event.
Both AbnVol (big and small) and AbnTr (individual vs.
institutional) of different investor groups are used to see
how different groups of investors vary in responding to the
release of TC announcements. A significant negative
(positive) UMTS1 suggests that individual investors trade
more in response to TC than institutional investors (H3.6).
We examine the wealth effect of individual investors in
response to TC with hypothesis 3.7. A negative (positive)
UMTS9 suggests that the trading response among indi-
vidual investors decreases (increases) with wealth.
4.3 Data collection
The goal of this study is to investigate the share price and
trading behavior of publicly traded firms announcing plans
to join TCG, invest in TC technology, including software,
hardware, and platform. The first step toward this goal is to
identify those firms and the dates of their TC announce-
ments. We use two data sources to search for such events,
one is the official website of Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) (http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org) on which
most of the announcements for becoming a member, con-
firming membership, adopting TC technology, or releasing
a new product are listed; the other one is Factiva Database
which includes major American and international news-
papers (up to 9,000 publications worldwide) and is updated
on a daily basis. Through these processes, two types of
announcements are included in our final samples:
(a) Adoption-related announcements, including news
announcing that a firm is adopting TC components or
technology, or joining a TC organization to support the
further development of TC industry and technology.
(b) Business development announcements, including
announcements about the availability of new TC
products, upgrades of existing products equipped with
TC technology or components, or disclosure of
cooperation in producing TC products, or business
deals demonstrating that a large amount of products
Table 1 Hypotheses (in null form)
Return Aggregate trading
response
Relative trading response
H1: AbnR = 0 H2.1: AbnV B 0 H3.1: AbnVolbig B 0
H2.2: AbnTr B 0 H3.2: AbnVolmedian B 0
H2.3: APOS B 0 H3.3: AbnVolsmall B 0
H3.4: AbnTr100 B 0
H3.5: AbnTr30 B 0
H3.6: UMTS1 B 0
H3.7: UMTS9 B 0
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have been equipped with TC components. We also
double-check Factiva to make sure that, within a TC
announcement period, starting from 2 days before the
event day to 2 days after the event day, there are no
other confounding news events. We end up eliminat-
ing 17 TC related events which overlap with non-TC
related events, such as announcements of merger and
acquisition, changing of CEO, and election of com-
pany board members.2
To get our final list of TC-related announcements, after
the above processes, we apply the following to clean up our
samples.
1. Because we are interested in how the capital market
responds to TC technology adoption, non-publicly
traded firms are excluded from our study.
2. Announcements from which a particular firm cannot
be identified with certainty are excluded as well.
3. Non US public firms are excluded as well because we
do not have access to the capital market data of non-
US firms.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of announcements by
years. In total, 210 announcements of 98 firms are col-
lected. Most of these firms are active members of Trusted
Computing Group.
Table 2 shows the summary of our final sample com-
posed of 124 announcements.
Company financial information was obtained from
COMPUSTAT, stock return data were obtained from the
CRSP database, while the individual trading data were
retrieved from the NYSE TAQ database.
5 Empirical findings
5.1 Price response
We employed both the simple average method and com-
pound method to estimate the aggregate abnormal returns.
AbnRiðm;nÞ ¼ 1
n  m þ 1
Xn
t¼m
AbnRit Average Methodð Þ
AbnRiðm;nÞ ¼ 1 þ
Yn
t¼m
ðAbnRit þ 1Þ ðCompound MethodÞ
Table 3 shows the abnormal returns on a daily basis as
well as on an aggregate level, starting from 2 days before
the event day (i.e., t - 2) to 2 days after the event day (i.e.,
t ? 2).
Overall, regardless of the time window and the estima-
tion methods, the abnormal return is insignificant from
zero, failing to reject hypothesis H1. In others words, based
on our sample period, we do not find evidence that TC
related announcements have information content. In fact,
one implicit assumption researchers taken for granted is
that an information release lacks information content if
price invariance is observed [40]. Our interpretation for the
lack of price response is that price invariance indicates that
investors might not believe the value relevance of TC
technology, which results in no response to the TC related
events announcements in the capital market. An alternative
explanation is that maybe the price changes are so ‘‘small’’
that we fail to detect them statistically.
5.2 Trading response
Multiple methods are employed to examine the trading
response to a TC information release on daily level as well
as on aggregate level. Table 4 shows the abnormal volume
of the overall market as well that of the big and small
investor groups’ response. Table 5 reports the market-wide
abnormal number of transactions and the abnormal number
of transactions of the individual investor group and the
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Fig. 3 TC announcements by year, 2003–2004 (N = 210)
Table 2 Summary of sample
Released announcements 210
Less: duplicate announcements (9)
Less: released by non-public firms (65)
Less: released by public firms not traded on US stock market (12)
Final sample size 124
2 Recall that regardless of whether consumers treat TC as favorable or
unfavorable, as long as investors have heterogeneous valuation of TC,
then we should expect that TC technology related announcements will
be associated with increased volume. Hence, trading volume study
with confounding events is a conservative test because if we fail to
observe an increase in trading volume with confounding events, then it
will be even less likely for us to observe a market trading response
associated with TC announcement without confounding events.
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institutional investor group, while Table 6 depicts the mean
transaction size and the proportion of outstanding shares.
On the aggregate level, most of the time the total
abnormal trading volume (AbnVol in Table 4) and the
abnormal number of transactions (AbnTr in Table 5) are
not significantly different from zero on individual days and
over different event windows. The abnormal percentage of
shares traded (APOS in Table 6) is significant most of the
time; however it is significantly negative instead of posi-
tive. If TC announcements do have information value,
regardless of whether it is viewed positively or negatively,
we should expect an increased trading volume around the
event day. However, what we actually observed is a
decrease in trading activity. A decrease in trading volume
means that we fail to find support for TC announcements
having information content. Overall since there is no
trading response to TC announcements, H2.1 and H2.2
cannot be rejected.
On the relative trading response level, the abnormal
volumes of different groups (Table 4) and the abnormal
number of transactions of big investors (Table 5) are
insignificant from zero except for big investors. The
decrease in the abnormal volume of big investors might be
caused by the decrease in the number of transactions of
Table 3 Test of abnormal
return
Notes: P value is in parentheses
and two-sided
AbnR1 CAPM model AbnR2 Fama
French model
AbnR3 Fama
French adjustment
Event days
-2 -0.003 (0.2759) -0.002 (0.4801) -0.003 (0.3376)
-1 0.0042 (0.2065) 0.0052 (0.1187) 0.0057 (0.1178)
0 -0.002 (0.5716) -0.002 (0.5781) 0.001 (0.7689)
1 0.0001 (0.9459) 0.0011 (0.5617) 0.0011 (0.6217)
2 0.0007 (0.7747) -0.000047 (0.9852) 0.0012 (0.6565)
Event window
Average method
(-1, 0) 0.0013 (0.5579) 0.0018 (0.399) 0.0032 (0.1625)
(0, ?1) -0.00075 (0.6704) -0.00024 (0.8898) 0.0024 (0.3429)
(-1, ?1) 0.0009 (0.5706) 0.0016 (0.3142) 0.0033 (0.1095)
(-2, ?2) 0.000048 (0.9661) 0.0005 (0.6316) 0.0013 (0.2982)
Compound method
(-1, 0) 0.0025 (0.5736) 0.0036 (0.4163) 0.0071 (0.1619)
(0, ?1) -0.001 (0.6699) -0.00048 (0.8912) -0.00088 (0.8176)
(-1, ?1) 0.0026 (0.5887) 0.0047 (0.3307) 0.003 (0.4842)
(-2, ?2) -0.000085 (0.988) 0.0024 (0.6771) 0.0034 (0.5949)
Table 4 Abnormal volume
AbnVol AbnVolbig AbnVolsmall
Event days
-2 -0.139** (0.0243) -0.158** (0.0338) 0.0333 (0.688)
-1 -0.082 (0.2519) -0.065 (0.4166) 0.1646 (0.2155)
0 -0.094 (0.3647) -0.201* (0.0544) 0.062 (0.5593)
1 -0.08 (0.3272) -0.183** (0.0253) 0.0772 (0.4127)
2 -0.134 (0.1411) -0.131 (0.2594) 0.0249 (0.8176)
Event window
(-1, 0) -0.088 (0.2314) -0.131* (0.0706) 0.1133 (0.2974)
(0, ?1) -0.087 (0.2811) -0.198** (0.0143) 0.0696 (0.4479)
(-1, ?1) -0.085 (0.2095) -0.15** (0.0242) 0.1013 (0.3056)
(-2, ?2) -0.106* (0.0779) -0.153** (0.0134) 0.0724 (0.4052)
Notes: P value is in parentheses and two-sided; * is significant at a P
value between 0.05 and 0.10, ** is significant at a P value of 0.05 or
less
Table 5 Abnormal number of transactions
AbnTr AbnTr30 AbnTr100
Event days
-2 -0.035 (0.6724) -0.01 (0.9111) -0.22** (0.0002)
-1 0.0393 (0.6882) 0.0694 (0.4907) -0.163** (0.0166)
0 0.0226 (0.8282) 0.0578 (0.5807) -0.193** (0.0206)
1 0.0776 (0.4352) 0.1039 (0.3022) -0.105 (0.1898)
2 -0.053 (0.6056) -0.024 (0.8136) -0.143 (0.1031)
Event window
(-1, 0) 0.0309 (0.7298) 0.0636 (0.4882) -0.178** (0.0058)
(0, ?1) 0.0051 (0.5742) 0.0809 (0.3747) -0.149** (0.0249)
(-1, ?1) 0.0465 (0.5802) 0.0771 (0.375) -0.154** (0.0087)
(-2, ?2) 0.0104 (0.8889) 0.0395 (0.6101) -0.165** (0.0028)
Notes: P value is in parentheses and two-sided; * is significant at a P
value between 0.05 and 0.10, ** is significant at a P value of 0.05 or
less
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institutional investors (the significant negative AbnTr100 in
Table 5), which is consistent with the decrease in the size
of each transaction (UMTS1 \ 0 on the event day but
insignificant on the other days in Table 6). The negative
UMTS1 represents the situation where there are either
fewer big investors or more small investors engaged in the
trading. This supports our former findings (APOS \ 0).
Given that both AbnVolsmall and AbnTr30 are not signifi-
cantly different from zero, while AbnVolbig and AbnTr100
are significantly less then zero, we believe it is very likely
that the relatively fewer trades from big or institutional
investors, instead of relatively more trades from small
individual investors, led to a decrease in the proportion of
common shares outstanding traded. Furthermore, except on
day t ? 2, for most of the time, the UMTS9 of Table 6 is
not significantly different from zero either. All these lead to
one conclusion: regardless of investor group (institutional
vs. individual) or individual investor wealth status (wealthy
vs. less wealthy), investors valuate and respond in similar
ways to TC announcements. For big investors, such
announcements have even less information content. Over-
all, within our sample periods, we fail to find evidence that
TC is value relevant and TC announcement has informa-
tion content to either the market as whole or to different
types of investors. The hypothesis series 3 (from 3.1 to 3.7)
cannot be rejected either.
Even though within our sample period, we fail to find an
increased market response to the adoption of TC for our
overall sample, this does not necessarily mean that TC is
not value relevant. Market response to TC might be limited
to a certain group of firms. To address this issue, based on
the nature and time of TC adoption as well as the industry
of the adopters, we classify our firm events into different
groups, such as manufacturing firms versus service firms,
hardware related TC adoption versus software related TC
adoption, early adopters versus later adopters, and quali-
tatively our results do not change. Regardless of the nature
of the TC adoption, the time of the adoption, or the industry
of a firm, we still do not observe abnormal earnings or an
abnormal trading response to the adoption of TC. Fur-
thermore, such patterns hold for different types of investors
as well. The only difference we observe is that for com-
panies in the service industry, there seems to be a weak
positive price response 1 day before a TC announcement
(at 90% confidence interval); while for companies in the
manufacturing industry, we see a weak negative market
response on the TC announcement day (at 90% confidence
interval). We interpret this to mean that it would be hard
for consumers to appreciate the value of TC if that TC
technology is not linked to any service, and the value
provided by naked TC hardware without immediate
application might be perceived by investors as trivial, at
least for our sampling periods.
5.3 Change of accounting performance
Table 7 shows both the mean and median results of the
performance comparison between firms adopting TC
technology and their related industry peer group. As
elaborated in Sect. 4.1, for each TC firm, its peer group’s
financial performance is defined as the average financial
performance of its respective industry (excluding the TC
adopters) based on 4-digital industry classification code
SIC. Then we investigate whether on average TC firms
enjoy better financial performance as compared to their
industry peers. Such a comparison is conducted over a
specific window beginning 2 years before the year of TC
adoption and ending 2 years after the year of TC adoption.
Due to a data limitation of Compustat, we lose some
observations for year t ? 1 and year t ? 2 for those firms
adopting TC in 2005 or 2006.
Both a parametric t test (reported as Mean and T-sta-
tistics) and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank test (reported
as Median and Z-statistics) are employed to examine the
Table 6 Abnormal proportion
of shares and mean transaction
size
Notes: P value is in parentheses
and two-sided; * is significant at
a P value between 0.05 and
0.10, ** is significant at a P
value of 0.05 or less
APOS UMTS1 UMTS9
Event days
-2 -0.002** (0.0001) -0.025 (0.3755) -0.008 (0.4284)
-1 -0.003** (0.0002) 0.0031 (0.9254) -0.004 (0.6457)
0 -0.003** (0.0001) -0.052** (0.0354) -0.011 (0.31)
1 -0.003** (0.0006) -0.026 (0.2807) -0.001 (0.9036)
2 -0.003** (\0.0001) -0.038 (0.1719) -0.034** (0.0005)
Event window
(-1, 0) -0.003** (\0.0001) -0.024 (0.3107) -0.008 (0.3515)
(0, ?1) -0.003** (\0.0001) -0.039** (0.0620) -0.006 (0.4662)
(-1, ?1) -0.003** (\0.0001) -0.025 (0.2458) -0.006 (0.4735)
(-2, ?2) -0.003** (\0.0001) -0.028 (0.1725) -0.012 (0.1022)
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difference between the treatment (the TC adopters) and
control samples (the average of their respective industry
peers within the same 4-digital SIC). The reason for
including both a parametric T-test and the non-parametric
rank test is that the financial ratios might not be normally
distributed. Hence, compared to using the mean as the
performance measure, the medians are considered to be a
better performance indicator which is robust to outliers and
underlying statistical distribution assumptions [52].
Table 7 shows that compared to their industry peers, TC
firms enjoy a better ROA and profit margin (ROS), and
worse asset turn over ratio (SOA), before adoption (t - 2 to
t - 1), at adoption (year t), and after adoption (t ? 1 to
t ? 2). The test results are reported as either T-statistics
(parametric comparison) or Wilcoxon Rank Sum Z-statis-
tics (none-parametric difference). Figure 4 is a visual rep-
resentation of Table 7, year 0 means the year that TC was
Table 7 Performance
comparison between TC firms
and matched peer group 2 years
before adoption year
Notes: P value is in parentheses
and two-sided; * is significant at
a P value between 0.05 and
0.10; ** is significant at a P
value of 0.05 or less
N Mean Median T value Z value
ROA TC firms 31 -0.132 -0.013 -2.05** 3.803**
Peer group 31 -0.257 -0.239
ROS TC firms 31 -0.157 -0.013 -2.16** 3.515**
Peer group 31 -0.316 -0.323
SOA TC firms 31 0.755 0.627 1.850** -2.865**
Peer group 31 0.951 0.899
1 year before adoption year
ROA TC firms 31 -0.119 -0.014 -1.380 2.951**
Peer group 31 -0.197 -0.213
ROS TC firms 31 -0.150 -0.018 -1.26 2.778**
Peer group 31 -0.239 -0.252
SOA TC firms 31 0.727 0.6072 2.58** -3.485**
Peer group 31 0.984 0.9258
Adoption year
ROA TC firms 31 -0.058 0.024 -1.82** 4.113**
Peer group 31 -0.152 -0.153
ROS TC firms 31 -0.062 0.024 -1.99** 3.549**
Peer group 31 -0.177 -0.185
SOA TC firms 31 0.748 0.639 2.64** -3.141**
Peer group 31 0.987 0.946
1 year after adoption year
ROA TC firms 28 -0.009 0.0533 -2.45** 4.697**
Peer group 28 -0.128 -0.140
ROS TC firms 28 0.0225 0.0538 -2.95** 4.566**
Peer group 28 -0.125 -0.135
SOA TC firms 28 0.8234 0.7129 1.50 -3.139**
Peer group 28 0.988 0.9510
2 year after adoption year
ROA TC firms 23 -0.007 0.0437 -1.76** 4.134**
Peer group 23 -0.102 -0.093
ROS TC firms 23 0.012 0.0761 -1.92** 4.046**
Peer group 23 -0.104 -0.109
SOA TC firms 23 0.8139 0.8023 1.73** -1.869**
Peer group 23 0.9547 0.9290
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adopted, and year 2 means 2 years after the adoption, and so
on. ROA_DIFF (ROA of TC firms minus ROA of control
groups) and ROS_DIFF (ROS of TC firms minus ROS of
control groups) are above zero before firms adopt TC
technology; while SOA_DIFF (SOA of TC firms minus
SOA of control groups) is below zero. To summarize, TC
adopters seem to have better historical performance than
their industry peers before and after adoption. However,
after adoption, as time moves on, the performance gap
between these two groups (adopters vs. their peers)
becomes narrower instead of wider. Thus, no concrete
conclusion can be drawn at this moment. It seems more
likely for firms with better financial performance (ROA and
ROS) to adopt TC technology; however, such an adoption
does not lead to an improved future financial performance.
Table 8 shows the regression results with the historical
financial performance controlled. The results indicate that
firms with better historical financial performance do con-
tinuously enjoy a better future financial performance,
supporting the argument that in order to draw meaningful
conclusions, we need to control the historical financial
performance of TC adopters. At 95% confidence interval,
in both 1 and 2 years after TC, neither of the dummy
variables in these three models is significantly different
from zero. Pooling all these results together, with previous
financial performance controlled, we can see that the
adoption of TC has no immediate financial impact.
6 Conclusions and discussions
According to event study methodology, for the announce-
ments with information value, good (bad) news is associ-
ated with positive (negative) share price reactions. Our
study finds price invariance on the announcements dis-
closing TC technology related adoption, indicating that TC
technology announcement has no information content.
Results consistent with the price result are also found
when examining trading activities. On the aggregate level,
no significant results are found by either overall trading
volume or the number of transactions test (failure to reject
Hypothesis H2.1 and H2.2). Even though the abnormal
percentage of outstanding shares (APOS), the abnormal
trading of big investors (AbnVolbig) or institutional inves-
tors (AbnTr100) are significantly different from zero, their
values are smaller instead of bigger than zero. This again
indicates that TC technology announcements lack infor-
mation content. A negative UMTS1 on event days sup-
ported by a decreasing trading volume and a decreasing
number of transactions by big investors or institutional
investors indicate that big or institutional investors trade
even less when there are TC announcements. We also fail
to find evidence that TC announcements are value relevant
for individual investors, regardless of their wealth status
(wealthy vs. less wealthy). To conclude, in response to TC
announcements, no sign of price response or higher trading
activity has been found in this study (Table 9).
Facing the fight between proponents and opponents of
TC technology, this study investigates the valuation of TC
issues from capital market and financial performance per-
spectives. We document that the fast growing Trusted
Computing Group and huge investments in TC technology
are rewarded with an indifferent response from the stock
market. This paradox is explained when we examine the
accounting performance impact of TC adoption. Our
results fail to show that firms receive any extra accounting
benefit after adopting TC technology, which might explain
Table 8 Regression result
Notes: P value is in parentheses
and two-sided; * is significant at
a P value between 0.05 and
0.10, ** is significant at a P
value of 0.05 or less
Related financial performance at adoption
N Intercept Year Dummy
1 year after adoption
ROAt?1 56 -0.0235 (0.3965) 0.6266** (\0.0001) 0.0537 (0.1293)
ROSt?1 56 -0.0092 (0.7450) 0.5985** (\0.0001) 0.0651* (0.0716)
SOAt?1 56 -0.0006 (0.9934) 1.0121** (\0.0001) 0.0574 (0.2791)
2 years after adoption
ROAt?2 46 0.0163 (0.4278) 0.7226** (\0.0001) 0.0284 (0.2797)
ROSt?2 46 0.041* (0.0805) 0.7404** (\0.0001) 0.02 (0.495)
SOAt?2 46 0.1909** (0.0081) 0.7961** (\0.0001) 0.04 (0.344)
Table 9 Summary of results
Return Aggregate trading
response (no trading
response)
Relative trading response
(no relative trading
difference)
AbnR = 0 AbnVol = 0 AbnVolbig B 0
AbnTr = 0 AbnVolmedium = 0
APOS \ 0 AbnVolsmall = 0
AbnTr100 = 0
AbnTr30 = 0
UMTS1 \ 0
UMTS9 = 0
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the price invariance and volume invariance we observed in
the stock market.
In the literature, researchers have successfully used
event study methodology to document the value impact of
IT investments. So, why can we not document the value of
TC using event study methodology in our study? Is this
another story of IT paradox in which firms invest huge
amounts in TC but with limited, if not negative financial
gain? We have run an exhaustive search for some small
evidence that might reveal the value of TC, unfortunately
the results are very disappointing.
So what next? Does this mean that the fate of TC is
doomed? The answer is no. Even though TC does not impact
accounting performance 1 year after adoption, there might
be a lag effect; in other words, it might take many years
before firms can realize their investment in TC. If there were
a lag between the costs and benefits of IT, then research that
relates earnings to contemporaneous IT spending would not
detect the performance impact of IT spending [42]. Assim-
ilation has been identified as an important construct in the
causal chain that separates the adoption of IT from its impact
on firm performance [58–61].
Then why do not investors get the picture? Is not the
stock market an efficient market? Is not the stock market
supposed to reflect this long-term performance impact? We
believe that the real answer is education. TC itself is
complicated and hard to be appreciated and digested by
end-consumers. Facing the uncertainty of the functionality
and future prospects of TC, consumers might just choose to
ignore TC related announcements. So, in order to make TC
successful, vendors need to put more emphasis on edu-
cating end consumers about the potential costs and benefits
of TC technology. Before consumers can really wake-up
and understand the value of TC, they will continue falling
asleep. The other reason for market silence might be driven
by the limited availability of applications supported by TC.
Without such applications, it is going to be very hard for
consumers to digest the value of TC with TC-enabled
hardware alone. Do we know which side will wake the
consumers up? Or are they going to fall asleep forever?
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